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EVOLUTION AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF 
THE COSTA RICAN BANKING SYSTEM1 
by 
Mariano Rojas-Herrera2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past four decades, the Costa Rican banking system has been dominated by 
government-owned banks. This has been a consequence of the nationalization decree of 
1948, according to which government-owned banks became the only intermediaries 
authorized to mobilize demand deposits from the public. For a country with an 
undeveloped financial · system, this monopsony in the market for deposits, enjoyed by the 
four nationalized banks, permitted their supremacy in the financial system. 
It was not until the most recent decade, when a process of financial deregulation and 
financial innovation began, that a small fringe of private banks made their incursion into the 
industry. Over the past few years, this industry has experienced significant structural 
changes, tha~ deserve to be studied in their causes and consequences. In addition, the field 
of Industrial Organization has undergone important changes. Many new approaches and 
techniques, along with the revival of some old approaches, have broadened the areas of 
potential research and have revitalized theorical and empirical controversies. 
This research proposal presents a detailed design of a study of 
competition in the Costa Rican banking system, as part of the Financial 
Services Project, financed by the Agency for International Development 
{USAID), and implemented by The Ohio State University and Academia de 
Centroamerica. This research efford is part of the author's doctoral 
dissertation in the Department of Economics at Ohio State, under the direction 
of Prof. Claudio Gonzalez-Vega, the Project's Principal Investigator. 
2 Mariano Rojas-Herrera is a Costa Rican doctoral 
Department of Economics at The Ohio State University. 
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New trends in the field of Industrial Organization criticize the Structure-Conduct-
Performance paradigm for being deterministic, overs tressing the role of market structure and 
understressing. the role of conduct. The emergence of the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization calls for a shift from the industry to the firm as the primary unit of analysis. 
It asks for research at the intra-industry rather than the inter-industry level, emphasizing 
the use of time series data from single industries, and highlighting the role of conduct as a 
prominent variable in the determination of an industry's structure and the performance of 
firms. 
Besides, the revival of the Austrian School, together with the Evolutionary Theory, 
ask for a greater interest in the dynamic aspects of the evolution of an industry's structure, 
where the structure is neither exogenous nor static, and where the equations of motion 
receive more attention than the static notion of equilibrium. Significant structural 
transformation in the Costa Rican banking industry, together with changes in the field of 
Industrial Organization, motivate the proposed study. 
The purpose of this proposal is twofold. First, sections 2 and 3 analyze the 
consequences of the nationalization decree and describe the evolution of the structure of 
the Costa Rican banking industry. Special emphasis is placed on the 1980s, when a 
significant structural change, characterized by the entry of small private banks and the steady 
decline of concentration indices, took place. It is shown that the evolution of the Costa 
Rican banking industry contains interesting features. 
Second, in accordance with recent developments in the field of Industrial 
Organization, the main hypotheses are developed and the econometric techniques to test 
them are presented in sections 4, 5, and 6. Special emphasis is given to Markov stochastic 
' 
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processes and to clustering techniques, because of their usefulness to analyze dynamic 
situations and the firms' strategic behavior, respectively. A final section discusses the data 
needed for the empirical analysis. 
2. THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE co TA rue BANKS 
In 1948, a few months after a two-month civil war, the new provisional Government -
the Junta- dictated a decree nationalizing the largest banks of the country. The true reasons 
behind this nationalization are still motive of controversy3. The nationalization decree 
stated: 
''Private Banking is nationalized. Only the state will be authorized to mobilize, 
through its own institutions, the deposits of the public. '4 
This nationalization implied a monopsony in the mobilization of deposits from the 
public for the four government-owr:ied banks. It did not affect financial intermediation at 
large5• It did not become illegal to operate private banks, but rather for private bankers 
to mobilize deposits from the public. It was still possible for private bankers to participate 
in the industry with non-deposit funds. The decree has not been free of criticism and 
reform initiatives. Some modifications to the related legislation were made in the following 
decades; nevertheless, the structure of the banking industry in Costa Rica remained almost 
intact until the 1980s. 
3 Ortuno (1963) and Gonzalez-Vega and Mesalles (1988) provide an excellent 
examination of the nationalization of the banking system in Costa Rica. 
See Gonzalez-Vega and Mesalles (1988). 
5 This nationalization must be understood as a transfer of ownership from 
private national bankers to the State. Thus, it must not be confused with usual 
Latin American nationalizations that involve a transfer of ownership from 
foreigners to nationals. 
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The following are some of the main features of the Costa Rican banking system after 
the nationalization: 
(a) The government-owned banking system consists of four banks: Banco Nacional de 
Costa Rica, Banco de Costa Rica, Banco Anglo-Costarricense, and Banco Credito 
Agricola de Cartago. Autonomous by law, in practice they became heavily 
intervened by the Government. 
(b) As a result of intense government intervention and the power of the authorities, the 
prospects for explicit and implicit coordination of the. state-owned bank strategies, 
i.e., tacit collusion:, should not be discarded. It is very likely that the Central Bank, 
as the regulator, became an instrument for the. government-owned banks to 
coordinate their decisions6• 
( c) The nationalized banks were expected to carry out social objectives. They were 
forced, for example, to finance specific projects and to help preferred sectors, chosen 
on the basis of social and political rather than economic criteria. The profit-oriented 
behavior of the nationalized banks was thus heavily constrained7• 
( d) The Central Bank implemented strict controls on the allocation of credit and the 
setting of interest rates (at subsidized levels in many cases). It is reasonable to 
hypothesize that the nationalization decree implied collusive tendencies in both the 
6 This argumemt of the regulator as a regulatee·s' agent has been 
introduced by Stigler (1971). 
7 
.Some authors are incli'ned to consider the extreme case. They state 
that the government-owned banks do not behave as profit .ma·ximizers at all. 
Other authors have a pr·eferent:e to see the ·government-owned banks as profit 
maximizers but facing a heavy burden as a con·sequence of government 
intervention. This burde.n could be inte.rpreted as a tax. S·everal 
considerations have been made about the ·existence of other arguments in the 
objective function of the nat.ionalized banks. 
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input and the output markets and a behavior of the government-owned banks that 
contained non-economic considerations. Moreover, lack of competition in the 
industry may have bee·n a disincentive to pursue economic efficiency more 
aggressively. 
The emergence of a dynami pr· te b nking ~e ctor in he 1980s sh uld imply, if the 
hypotheses above are true, a structural change that goes beyond a simple variation in the 
concentration index, altering the way in which the nationalized banks behave and their 
performance in both the input and the output markets. Finally, the nationalization decree 
did not prohibit the operation or entry of new private banks, but it constrained their sources 
of funds. Hence, the fact that no private bank entered the industry for several decades, 
combined with a total modification of the situation in the 1980s, requires an explanation. 
3. EVOLUTION OF THE BANKING INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
Table 1 shows the evolution of the market shares of the government-owned banks 
with respect to total assets and total earning assets of the system. Because these are the 
four largest banks in the industry, this information can be associated to a C4 index. Table 
1 shows the evolution of the Herfindahl index for both total assets and earning assets as 
well. 
This table shows an almost complete dominance of the banking industry by the 
government-owned banks until the 1980s. Their market shares were near or above 99 
percent. The Herfindahl indices indicate that the industry was highly concentrated during 
those years. On the other hand, a strong tendency towards deconcentration is evident 
during the 1980s, the market share of the nationalized banks fell from 99.1 percent in 
6 
December 1980 to 69.6 percent in June 1990. The Herfindahl index for earning assets 
declined from 0.333 to 0.170 during the same period. 
TABLE 1 
COSTA RICA: MARKET SHARE OF THE GOVERNMENT-OWNED 
BANKS AND INDUSTRY'S HERFINDAHL INDEX 
YEAR 
1955 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1982 
1984 
1986 
1988 
1990 
NOTES: 
T.A. E.A. H-T.A. 
99.1 99.2 0.3595 
99.6 99.7 0.3320 
99.7 99.8 0.3375 
99.4 99.6 0.3310 
98.9 99.2 0.3216 
98.9 99.1 0.3354 
96.8 97.1 0.3115 
94.6 97.1 0.3115 
90.2 84.1 0.2651 
86.7 73.7 0.2446 
87.3 69.6 0.2531 
T-E.A. 
0.3619 
0.3281 
0.3350 
0.3246 
0.3245 
0.3330 
0.3172 
0.3172 
0.2331 
0.1861 
0.1702 
T.A. = Market share of government-owned banks in total assets. 
E.A. = Market share of government-owned banks in earning assets. 
H-T.A. = Herfindahl index for banking industry's total assets. 
H-E.A. = Herfindahl index for banking industry's earning assets. 
Preliminary tests using the C4 index show the presence of structural change in the 
Costa Rican banking industry. Table 2 contains results from regressions using data for 
earning assets, in particular from restricted regressions using pooled data for the period 
from June 1974 to June 1990, and from unrestricted regressions using either December 1978 
or December 1982 as the break point8• 
Three different methods were applied. First, ordinary least squares (OLS) was used. 
Two shortcomings were found: the Durbin-Watson coefficient is very low, showing the 
These unrestricted regressions are specified in such a way that 
continuity is assured at the break point. 
. ' 
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presence of autocorrelation, and this method does not guarantee that the dependent variable 
is between 0 and 1. Second, in order to correct for autocorrelation, an AR(l) specification 
for the error term was assumed. Third, a logistic specification was fitted in order to correct 
for the dependent variable's restriction9• 
'.ABLE 2 
COSTA RICA: ECONOMETRIC RESULTS ON CONCENTRATION OF BANKING INDUSTRY 
SPECIF. RRS N R**2 DW 
1 0.12805 65 0.772 
2 0.00457 65 0.947 
3 0.04935 65 0.912 
4 0.00623 65 0.989 
5 0.00331 65 0.994 
6 20.4300 65 0.886 
7 13.0500 65 0.927 
1: pooled data, (restricted regression) y = a + {3 Quarter + e 
0.042 
0.196 
0.103 
0.120 
0.188 
2: unrestricted regression, ensuring continuity at break point, break point = Dec. 
1982. y = <X + f31*01 + f32*02 + E 
3: unrestricted regression, ensuring continuity at break point, break point = Dec. 
1978 
4: pooled data, assuming AR(l) for errors. 
5: unrestricted regression, assuming AR(l) for errors, ensures continuity at break 
point = Dec. 1982. 
6: pooled data, logistic specification. 
7: unrestricted regression, logistic specification, ensures continuity at break point = 
Dec. 1982 
9 The specification of the logistic functions are: 
Regression for pooled data: 
1 
Regression with break point and continuity at t': 
where: 
t. = t 
t. = t' 
c - 1 
t - 1 + exp ( Po + P 1 t1 + P 2 t2) 
if t < t' 
if t ~ t' 
t2 = 0 if t ~ t, 
t2 = t-t, if t > t, 
8 
The objective of these regressions was to gain preliminary insights about structural 
change in the banking industry. Later on, the Markov Chain technique and other methods 
can be used to test for structural change, by using the market shares of all the firms in the 
industry. An F-test was applied as a preliminary test for structural change. Table 3 shows 
that structural change has occurred. Moreover, combined with table 1, it suggests that the 
change took place towards the beginning of the 1980s. 
TABLE 3 
F-TEST FOR STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF THE COSTA RICAN BANKING INDUSTRY 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
OLSl 
OLS2 
AR(l}l 
LOGIST.1 
NOTE: */significant at 5%. 
* * / significant at 10%. 
TOTAL ASSETS 
384.0* 
160.3* 
7.7** 
32.4* 
EARNING ASSETS 
1675.2* 
98.9* 
54.5* 
35.1* 
More than a simple change in the trend of the concentration measures over time, 
what the Costa Rican banking industry experienced during the 1980s was a total 
transformation in its structure. The fridustry underwent a substantial process of entry. 
Table 4 presents the evolution of the number of banks in the industry10• During the 1980s, 
the number of banks increased from 9 to more than 20; in fact, during this period 16 new 
banks entered and 4 banks exited the industry. When the examination is limited to the 
private sector of the industry, it is found that the number of banks increased from 5 in 
10 The definition of an industry's boundaries is always a problem. This 
proposal restricts the analysis to those entities authorized to use the word 
"bank" in their names. In addition to the government-owned and private banks, . the 
Costa Rican financial system includes a large number of finance companies and 
financial cooperative associations, some savings and loans associations, one 
government-owned insurance company, and other public sector financial 
institutions. 
.. 
1 
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December, 1980 to 17 in June, 1990, for an increase of almost 250 percent. It is also 
important to recognize the vital role played by the grow of some of the new banks in the 
industry's transformation. Actually, the majority of the new banks entered in very small 
sizes; however, some of them have shown notable rates of growth in their market shares. 
fABLE 4 
COSTA RICA: EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF BANKS. 
ENTRY AND EXIT RATES 
DEC/YEAR #BANKS # NAT.B. # PRIV.B. ENTRIES EXITS 
1976 8 4 4 
1978 9 4 5 1 0 
1980 9 4 5 1 1 
1982 14 4 9 5 0 
1984 17 4 13 3 0 
1986 21 4 17 4 0 
1988 23 4 19 4 2 
1990* 21 4 17 0 2 
NOTE: * / corresponds to June, 1990. 
In summary, this first examination of the data generates the following facts · and 
hypotheses: 
(a) In the Costa Rican banking industry some private banks are expanding by taking over 
the market shares of the large, dominant, government-owned banks, whose market 
shares are changing as well. 
(b) Competition among banks can not be merely characterized as competition between 
private and government-owned banks. In fact, depending on the period considered, 
it is possible to detect situations where private banks compete with private banks, 
nationalized banks compete with nationalized banks, and private banks compete with 
nationalized banks. 
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(c) The intensity of these different ways of competition has not remained constant over · 
time. Thus, in this case competition refers more to a process than to a situation. 
( d) Not all the incumbent banks are behaving in the same way; it is conceivable to have 
some degree of heterogeneio/ in the strategies (conduct) followed by the firms. 
( e) There has been an accompanying process of birth and death · of firms. 
(t) The conditions for some degree of collusion among the government-owned banks 
existed before the 1980s. It would be interesting to observe what happened with this 
collusive tendencies during and after the structural change. In other words, one 
would like to know how the cartel reacted. 
In conclusion, the issue is the evolution of an industry, where structural change has 
occurred and which is in a process of continuous transformation. To understand the 
evolution of this industry, a dynamic approach is needed. It is also important to study the 
relationship between this structural transformation of the industry and some performance 
and conduct measures. The majority of the research on the relationship between structure 
and performance uses cross-industry studies and, in consequence, the emphasis placed on 
the idiosyncratic characteristics of the industry is minor. The presence of structural change 
in the Costa Rican banking industry allows for an study of the (inter)relationship between 
structure and performance, where conduct and idiosyncratic attributes of the industry play 
an important role. 
4. :MARKOV PR~ AND 'lHE SllJDY OF 'lHE EVOUJilON OF INDUSIRY SIRUCIURFS 
"Uncertainty, complexity, and dynamism have been continuing challenges to 
man's understanding and control of his physical environment. In the 
development of logical structures to describe these phenomena, the model 
11 
originated by A. A. Markov stands as a major accomplishment. Where previous 
contributors had modeled uncertainty as a sequence of independent trials, 
Markov saw the advantage of introducing dependence of each trial on the result 
of its predecessor. While it is tempting to consider even more complex 
dependency of the present trial on the results of past trials, such temptation 
usually leads to results that are both analytically and computationally intractable . 
... Consequently, Markov models represent the first outpost in the domain of 
dependent models that is powerful both in capturing the essence of many 
dependent systems observed in practice and in producing the ana ytical and 
computational results necessary to gain insight into their behavior. "11 
Markov stochastic processes have been extensively used in the literature to analyze 
dynamic processes in several economic areas (e.g., Steindl, 1965; Chiappori,1984; Newman 
and Wolfe, 1961; Padberg, 1962; Mellor, 1984; Hallberg, 1969; Atkin and Blandford, 1982; 
Raj et al 1979; Mellor and Hessner, 1986)12• 
4.1 MARKOV CHAINS 
A Markov chain can be associated with a sequence of trials where the probability of 
the outcome of each individual trial depends on the outcome of the immediately preceding 
trial, but not on the other prior outcomes. If the set of potential outcomes is finite, then the 
stochastic process is called a first-order Markov chain. 
Given a constant transition probability, the outcome in trial t depends only on the 
outcome in trial t-1. Since the outcome in trial t-1 depends on the outcome in trial t-2, and 
so on, by applying a recursive method it is possible to relate the outcome in trial t to any 
11 
· Howard, 1971, page ix. 
12 For an introduction to Markov Processes see Howard (1971); Hoel, Port, 
and Stone (1972); Iosifescu (1980); and Thie (1983). 
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past outcome, e.g. in trial t-n. Therefore, it is possible to characterize the whole outcome-
path (trajectory) in terms of an initial outcome in trial t-n and the transition probability. 
A first-order stationary Markov process is characterized by the following statement 
of conditional probability: 
(1) 
This statement indicates that the probability for variable x to be in state sj in trial 
t is conditional on the state where this variable was in trial t-1, and on the probability of 
moving from the state where it ~as in t-1 to the state Sj in trial t. It is assumed to be 
independent of the trial itself. 
Then, for a finite vector of n states: Sh S2, •••• ,Sn, it is possible to define a matrix of 
transition probabilities P, whose elements Pij show the probability of being in state Sj in trial 
t having been in state Si in trial t-1. This matrix is called the transition 
probabilities matrix or stochastic matrix. It can be represented as: 
Pu P12 P13 . 
P21 P22 P23 • 
p (2) 
The nature of the process implies that the rows of the matrix must satisfy the 
following two conditions: 
. I 
13 
(3) 
0 ~ pjj ~ 1 (4) 
4.2. MARKOV CHAINS AND THE S Z I u F F ... RMS 
Stochastic Markov processes have been applied to the study of the evolution of the 
size distribution of firms (e.g., Adelman, 1958; Horowitz and Horowitz, 1968; Hart and 
Prais, 1956). In these studies, many size categories are defined, and the industry's firms are 
classified according to size. These size categories play the same role as the states in trial 
analysis. 
When a Markov chain process is used to study the evolution of the size distribution 
of firms, the transition probabilities Pij depict the likelihood, for a firm, of being in size 
category j at time t after having been in size category i at time t-1. Given an original size 
distribution of firms arid the matrix of transition probabilities, it is possible to describe a 
time path or trajectory for the evolution of the distribution of firm sizes. Furthermore, 
if one assumes that the transition probabilities matrix does not change in the future13, then 
it is possible to find at least one immovable point defining the limiting state probability 
of the process14• This immovable point may be associated to a long-run equilibrium 
or steady-state concept for the size distribution of firms. 
13 This is an assumption similar to the ceteris paribus assumption that 
economists use when predicting the future behavior of a variable. 
14 See Howard, 19 71, page 3 3 . 
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Mathematically, given an initial size distribution of firms at time t, shown by the 
vector 
(5) 
where sjt represents the proportion of firms in size class j at time t, and given the transition 
probabilities matrix [P], the next size distribution configuration can be calculated in the 
following way: 
(6) 
Applying successive substitutions one may end up with an immovable point Ej,t+Jc that 
satisfies the following equation: 
(E1 ( t+l)) x [P] (7) 
Therefore, one can claim that, if there is no change in the transition probabilities 
matrix, Ej,t+Jc defines the equilibrium situation of the process that explains the size 
distribution of firms, where 
(EJ ( t+k) ) (E1 ( t+k) , E2 ( t+k) , E3 ( t+k) , • . • • , En ( t+k) ) (8) 
It is important to notice that this is in fact a dynamic equilibrium for the firms 
and a static equilibrium for the industry as a whole. In other words, in the 
equilibrium situation firms are in an incessant competition to improve their size ranking. 
Some firms could be moving upward and other firms could be moving downward, but, as a 
whole, their movement · implies an industry's structure that is stable with respect to the 
proportion of firms in each size category. 
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4.3. MARKOV CHAINS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE FIRM'S MARKET SHARE 
Markov processes have been used to study the evolution of an industry's structure 
through the analysis of market shares as well (e.g., Raj, Kirkham and Clarke, 1979; Daskin, 
1985; Mellor and Hessner, 1986; Mellor, 1984; Atkin and Blandford, 1982). In this case, a 
first-order stochastic Markov mode c.an be s ec fie '.n ihe follow 'ng waJ : 
Mj ( t) = L M1 ( t-1 ) p ij 
1 
(i,j=l,2, ....... ,n) 
(9) 
where Mit) and Mj(t-1) are the observed market shares of firm j at time t and t-1 
respectively, and the Pij are the transition probabilities. With respect to market shares in 
the output market, the transition parameter Pij must be interpreted as the probability that 
a customer (or group of customers) will become a client of firm j after having been a client 
of firm i in the previous period15• 
The intuition behind the use of a first-order Markov stochastic process to explain the 
evolution of market shares is that at every period of time the firms are taking strategic 
actions to compete for customers in the market. These actions may succeed or fail to 
increase market shares, and their possible realization is represented by a density function. 
Thus, at the beginning of the period there is a density function associated with the 
probability of achieving different market shares at the end of the period. This density 
function is conditional on the firm's market share at the beginning of the period. In 
consequence, the initial position of the firm (market share at t) and the actions taken by the 
•~ A more accurate meaning for the term "customer" could be "$1-customer". 
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firm during the period, determine the firm's position at the end of the period (market share 
at t+ 1). 
Furthermore, because there are many firms in the industry, the market share 
realizations at the end of the period are interrelated. This is, the realization of the market 
share at t + 1 for firm i depends on its current position at t, the actions taken by firm i, and 
the actions taken by the other firms in the industry during the period in consideration. The 
use of a Markov chain takes into account this interrelation of market share realizations. 
4.4 ESTIMATION OF THE TRANSITION PROBABILITIES 
The problem faced is that the transition parameters are unknown and must be 
estimated. If one could keep track of all the customers in the system, then it would be 
easier to estimate the transition probabilities, but the information available generally refers 
to aggregate data such as the total firm's output or market shares. 
Fortunately, Lee, Judge, and Zellner (1970), and previously Telser (1963), showed 
that it is possible to estimate the transition probabilities from aggregate data, by using least-
squares techniques. Further developments have suggested different ways to estimate the 
transition parameters. The estimations suggested differ on the specification of the transition 
probabilities and on the techniques to be used. Constant and time-varying transition 
probabilities are among the specifications suggested. OLS, restricted LS, and Non-linear 
least squares are among the techniques employed. 
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(a) Constant Transition Probabilities estimated with Ordinary Least 
Squares Techniques: 
Given a sample data of market shares collected for n firms and T periods, then in 
order to estimate the transition probabilities, the stochastic Markov process may be written 
in matrix form as: 
where 
MJ 
MJ = AJ PJ + µJ 
E(µj) = 0 I 
P1j 
P2j 
pj 
Pni 
(j = 1, 2 I 3 I • • • I n) 
Jlj1 
µj 
l1j 
µj 
and Aj is the following (T x n) matrix: 
M1 ( 1 ) M2 ( 1 ) M3 ( 1) Mn ( 1) 
M1 ( 2 ) M2 ( 2 ) Mn ( 2 ) 
~ · 
1 ( T-1) M2 ( T-l) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
Then, the time-series data set of market shares can be used to estimate the unknown 
parameters Pij by using ordinary least squares (OLS) in the following equations: 
18 
n 
MJ ( t) = ~ M1 ( t-1) P 1:J + l.Lj f;1. 
( i I j : 1, 2 I • • • In) 
(t=2, 3, ... ,T) 
(13) 
where the disturbance terms µj(t) are assumed to have zero mean, and to be serially 
uncorrelated. Because there are n firms in the sample, the estimated parameters form the . (n *n) 
estimated transition probabilities matrix. 
(b) Constant Transition Probabilities estimated with Restricted Least Squares: 
Sometimes the ordinary least square estimates do not satisfy the restrictions mentioned 
in equations (3) and (4), in these cases it becomes necessary to apply restricted OLS to 
equations (13)16• 
(c) Varying Transition Probabilities estimated with restricted least squares: 
In this case a linear dependency between the transition probabilities and an exogenous 
explanatory variable is assumed17: 
(14) 
Notice that because X is a time series variable, or even time itself, then the transition 
probabilities become time-dependent, and there will be a transition probabilities matrix for every 
period. In consequence, X defines the time path of the transition probabilities and, indirectly, 
the time path of the industry's structure. 
16 See Lee, Judge and Zellner, 1970. 
17 In fact, X may be a vector of exogenous variables. In this case fJ 
becomes also a vector of parameters. For simplicity, the expression assumes 
that the transition probabilities at t are related to the current values of 
the exogenous variable X, in fact it is possible to argue that the transition 
probabilities at t are related to past values of X. 
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The estimation of the transition probabilities requires the application of restricted OLS 
to the following equations: 
n 
')' («1J + P1J Xt) M1(t-l) + µj 
f;1 
(it j : 1, 2 I 3 I • • • I n) ( t = 2 , , 3 , • • . , T) 
(15) 
Notice that this technique estimates the parameters aij and {3ij; from them it is possible 
to calculate the transition probabilities18• 
(d) Varying Transition Probabilities with Multinomial Logit Formulation and estimated 
with non-linear least squares: 
MacRae (1977) develops an econometric technique to estimate time-varying transition 
probabilities in a first-order Markov process. It assumes that the transition probabilities depend 
on an exogenous explanatory variable that, in consequence, defines the time-path of the 
transition probabilities and, indirectly, of the industry's structure. This technique uses a 
multinomial logit formulation of the transition probabilities in order to satisfy the parameter 
constraints19• 
18 Mellor and Hessner ( 1986) use a very interesting varying transition 
probabilities technique based on time-dependent dummy variables. They specify 
the transition probabilities in the following way: 
P1J = a.oij + a.lij D ( t) + a.2ij ~ ( t) 
where D(t) is a dummy-type explanatory variable that depends on time, and b(t) 
is a conventional binary variable to account for seasonality. With this 
technique it is possible to study the impact of external shocks and events 
such as regulatory reforms, macroeconomic shocks, and the like. Furthermore, 
one can model shocks whose effect is presumed to persist over time. 
This technique may also be useful to analyze the repercussions of 
regulations (intervention analysis), innovations, and any other external shock 
that can not be completely embraced by the firms at the moment of their intro-
duction. Mellor and Hess ner's t e chnique c a n a lso be used to study seasonal 
effects. Obviously, the quantity of dummy and other explanatory variables 
that can be included in the analysis is severely constrained by the size of 
the sample. 
19 This technique was suggested first by Theil, 1969. 
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MacRae assumes that each individual transition probability varies over time in response 
to exogenous variables. Thus, the following equation describes the functional form of the 
individual transition probabilities: 
(16) 
where z(t-1) is a vector of lagged exogenous or predetermined variables and {3ij is a vector of 
parameters relating the exogenous variables to the transition probabilities. Because the 
functional form ~j must be such that the transition probabilities satisfy the nonnegativity and 
sum-to-unity-by-rows conditions, then a specific formulation for fij must be assumed. MacRae 
proposes the following multinomial logit formulation for the functional form20 
F11 (z(t-1), P1/ ~ F11 = ln (P11 (t) / P1n (t)) 
C 1 - 1, 2, ... xn) 
( j : 1, 2 I • • • I n-i) (17) 
which for convenience uses the last · column of the transition probabilities matrix as 
denominator21• Equation (17) guarantees that the parameters Fij, that relate the space of the 
exogenous variables to the space of the transition ·probabilities, are nonnegative. From equation 
(17) one gets: 
~ This functional form is called Fij to differentiate it from the general 
formulation fij• 
21 For simplicity, the relationship between z ( t-1) and Fij may be assumed 
to be linear. For ·example, if there is just one exogenous variable z(t-1), 
then the specification for Fij becomes: 
F11 = Po1j + P11J Z ( t-1) 
Furthermore, if no exogenous variable is introduced, this technique 
makes it posssible to estimate constant transition probabilities. 
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P1J(t)/P1n(t) =exp (F1J) 
- P1i ( t) = exp (F1i) Pin ( t) 
The sum-to-unity-by-rows condition implies that 
n-1 n-1 
~ P11 ( t) P1n ( t) ~ expF1J ( t) - 1 - P1 n ( t) 
(18) 
(19) 
Therefore, it is possible to specify the individual transition probabilities in the following 
way: 
n-1 
Pin 1 / ( 1 + ~ exp F 1j ( t) 
and 
n-1 (20) 
exp F1J ( t) I [ 1 + ~ exp F11 ( t) 1 
for { j = 1 , . . . . . , n-1) 
These transition probabilities have the advantage of allowing for variation over time and 
satisfying the nonnegativity and sum-to-unity-by-rows conditions. The estimation of the 
transition probabilities requires an estimate first of the (3 parameters, by applying non-linear least 
squares to the following set of equations22 : 
n 
Mj ( t) fu P iJ ( t) M1 ( t-1 ) + µ j ( t) 
(j =1, 2, •••I n-1) 
The last column of the transition probabilities matrix can be obtained by residual, by 
applying the sum to unity by rows condition. 
22 Because the variance of the residuals µj(t) depends upon the lagged 
market shares (Mi(t-1)), the nonlinear estimates are consistent but not 
efficient. MacRae suggests an iterative GLS procedure to get more efficient 
estimates. 
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S. CLUSTER ANALYSIS AND TIIE USE OF PANEL DATA 
A vast literature deals with the existence of an structure within the industry. This 
literature assumes that the firms in an industry may follow different strategies and that, once 
they have chosen a particular strategy, it may be difficult for them to switch to other strategies 
in the short run. A non-structuralist approach, where the conduct of the firms plays a very 
important role in the determination of both their performance and the structure of the industry 
is appealing. This proposal is specially concerned with the relationship between the firms' 
conduct and the evolution of the industry's structure. 
According to the Evolutionary Theory, the Markov process· assumption is justified 
because the firms in the industry are exploring new strategies. If these strategies are successful, 
then the firms may enjoy a period of relative growth (market share expansion); if the strategies 
are not successful, this will be reflected in a period of market share contraction. The length of 
this period depends on the ability of the firms applying unsuccessful strategies to revert them and 
to either imitate the successful firms or to innovate with a better strategy23 • 
Furthermore, external shocks and events, such as an expansion of the fiscal deficit or a 
change in the relative prices of inputs, may transform the industry's structure, because the firms 
are not following similar strategies, and consequently they will not be equally affected. 
Therefore, it is crucial to test for the existence of strategic groups in the industry and to have 
an idea of the degree of strategic mobility barriers. 
In a contribution to the empirical literature of group structures, Oster (1982) develops 
exploratory tests to examine intergroup mobility in an industry. She uses a single strategic 
D It is also possible for the successful firms to suceessfully innovate 
in order to keep their relative advantage. These issues are clearly related 
to the degree of strategic mobility in the industry. 
23 
variable as the relevant criterium to define the strategic groups, and then develops a mobility 
index based on the ratio of the number of group changes during a given period over the number 
of potential group changes during the period24• Although the work of Oster focusses on 
comparing the mobility index among industries, it may be useful to study its evolution over time. 
The evolution of this mobility i1 dex ma; u a r,ood iudi dlor c1 U1e G .g ru tr ..... d in str~he0ic 
mobility barriers and strategic imitation. It must be stated that Oster's procedure to group firms 
is very rudimentary. 
A more rigorous methodology to group firms and to test the validity of the homogeneity 
assumption is followed by Hatten and Schendel ( 1977)25 • Their work consists of the use of 
panel data to test the null hypothesis of homogeneous conduct within the industry26• Thus it 
is important to study in detail Hatten and Schendel's methodology and to explain its usefulness. 
This clustering technique identifies the relationship that exists between a performance variable 
and a vector of strategic managed variables and exogenous structural variables for every firm. 
If the relationship is similar for two firms, one can argue for placing them in the same strategic 
group, because they show the same link between strategy and performance. 
Start with a panel data of the following observations: 
~ Oster works with the advertising to sales ratio. 
~ One of the more serious criticisms that Hatten and Schendel make to 
the cross-sectional studies is the implicit assumption, without testing it, of 
strategic homogeneity within the industry. 
u The methodology followed by Hatten and Schendel makes it possible to 
cluster the individual firms into strategic groups, to have a preliminary 
measure of the degree of heterogeneity within the industry (degree of industry 
fragmentation), to study how disparate groups are differently affected by 
changes in their managed strategic variables and in external variables, to 
test for structural break in the strategic behavior of the firms, and to 
analyze how the relative effectiveness of various managed variables changes 
over time. 
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Y1t 1 xt~t' X12t' xi.Jflt 
.1 : 1, • • • In) 
(t=l, ... ,T) (22) 
where the index i refers to firms, the index t refers to the observation period., the variable Yi 
refers to a measure of performance of firm i, and the variables ~j G=l,2, ... ,m) refer to 
strategic indicators and structural variables, these later variables may be current or lagged 
variables. 
Therefore, the model can be expressed as: 
Y1 = f (X1J) 
(i=l,2, . .. ,n) (23) 
(j=l,2, ... ,m) 
If one assumes a linear relationship between the vector of regressors and the regressand, 
and adds a disturbance term, the expression becomes: 
Yi = P10 + P11X11 + P12X12 + • • • • + P1mXim + _µi 
(i=l,2, . . . ,n) (24) 
Then, the first step to group firms consists in using OLS or GLS to estimate the 
unknown coefficients ({3 parameters) of the equation above. The second step involves the 
application of Chow tests for the null hypothesis: that the estimates for some firms are similar. 
Thus, this step requires to pool the data for all possible pairs · of firms and to estimate the {3 
parameters using the pooled data for each pair of firms27• Therefore, this second step clusters 
firms into groups of two. 
The grouping of firms into clusters faces two problems that are related to the 
determination of the appropriate order of pooling. First, what criteria to follow when the Chow 
27 Johnston, 1984, has a good exposition of the different techniques that 
can be used to pool time-series and cross-section data. An excellent 
exposition of the longitudinal analysis techniques is made by Hsiao (1989). 
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test accepts the null hypothesis for various groups containing the same firm. Second, what 
criteria to use to cluster new firms to the initial groups. Hatten and Schendel apply the 
methodology suggested by Johnson ( 1967) in his paper on the hierarchical cluster scheme. 
Johnson's methodology consists in the calculation of the ratio of the F-statistic to the critical F-
value at the 95 percent level for the Jcgrc\!S f rceJori 'nvolvcd · r every otential p2:ir 'Jf 
pooled firms. Then the F/Fc value is used as an unidimensional measure of the distance between 
firms or groups. The lower the ·value of this F/Fc, the closer the firms or groups are with 
respect to their strategic position. 
Hence, the third step involves the calculation of the F/Fc values for all the potential 
groups, obtaining a matrix of F/Fc values that can be used to cluster firms by looking at their 
degree of strategic closeness. This technique can be used further to merge new pairs of groups. 
The smallest F/Fc is joined first. A value of F/Fc larger than 1 may be a good criterium to use 
to stop clustering firms, because it means that the null hypothesis is rejected28 • 
Thus, following this clustering methodology one ends up with a segmentation of the 
industry into several strategic groups. This different look at the industry, which stresses the role 
of conduct, can be used to study how the different groups react and are affected by external 
shocks. It also permits to study the relationship between the firms' group membership and their 
performance in what respect to expanding their market shares. Furthermore, if the data shows 
some heterogeneity across time it may be possible to identify a break point and split the data for 
each time period. This time heterogeneity of the data can be used to study changes in the 
~ It is important to state that Hatten and Schendel recommend to avoid a 
totally mechanical application of the grouping procedure, and to combine the 
statistical technique with some selective pragmatism during the exploratory 
stages. 
26 
strategic distance between firms, to examine if there exists any change in the groups 
configuration, and to observe if there has been any change in the relative effectiveness of some 
strategic managed variables between the two time periods. 
6. LIST OF HYPOTHESES OF THE INVESTIGATION 
This section summarizes the main hypotheses of the proposed research and further 
comments on the methodology to test these hypotheses. 
6.1 STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Structural change took place in the Costa Rican banking industry. Preliminary tests for 
structural change used concentration indices. An F-test, that takes into account the whole 
industry, instead of a concentration index, could be used to test for structural change29• Raj 
et al (1979) suggest this procedure. 
6.2 COLUSION AND COMPETITION 
The nationalized banks were practically alone before the 1980s. There were clear 
opportunities for them to coordinate their decisions. The project hypothesizes that some kind of 
monopsonistic and monopolistic behavior (collusion) existed in the Costa Rican banking industry 
before the 1980s. Additionally, once the number, size, and aggressiveness of private banks 
increased, and the market share for the nationalized banks shrunk, one should expect a less 
~ Several exploratory methodologies exist to identify the moment when 
the structural break took place, for example, a CU SUM technique could be 
applied using a concentration index. 
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stable cartel, and in consequence the appearance of more rivalry among the nationalized 
banks30• 
The hypothesis is that the emergence of private banks forced the nationalized banks to 
react by fighting against each other, playing more aggressively, and competing strongly for wh~t 
is left of their market share (in either h~ vJtpL or · nput . 1a.r:cc .,,. ~1 ~trans· .ion f~:o1 a perict 
of collusion to a period of more intensive competition should be reflected in a decrease over time 
in the diagonal elements of the matrix (loyalty indicators) and an increase over time in some of 
the off-diagonal elements of the transition probabilities matrix31 • 
The methodology to be used to test this hypothesis consists in the specification of time-
varying transition probabilities. For simplicity of exposition, a linear dependency between the 
transition probabilities and time will be assumed. With a multinomial logit formulation, the 
specification of the transition probabilities and of the tests becomes more complicated. The 
intuition behind the tests is, however, the same32 • For this purpose, the transition probabilities 
can be specified in the following way33 : 
30 An initial exploration of this hypothesis was made by comparing 
quarter to quarter variability of market shares of the nationalized banks 
before and after 1980. In all the cases there was a significant increase in 
the variability of market shares. It must be stated that I am using the 
quarter to quarter stability of market shares as a proxy for the degree of 
competition. Very stable market shares are associated with the existence of 
collusion, while very unstable market shares are associated with the existence 
of competition. 
31 Notice that I am using the values of the transition probabilities as 
proxies for the degree of jdynamic) rivalry in the industry. 
32 It must be stated that the use of a multinomial legit formulation 
allows for additional analysis and considerations such as the rate at which 
the transition probabilities change over time. 
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becomes: 
If a multinomial legit formulation is used then the specification 
FiJ = Poij + PiiJ time 
28 
P1J = IJoiJ + IJiiJ time (25) 
In this case, the coefficient f3tij (estimated with data from the whole period from June 
1974 to June 1990) is an indicator of the long-run trend in the intensity of competition, and its 
sign is very important to evaluate whether loyalty (a proxy for collusion) and/or rivalry has 
changed over time in the nationalized sector of the banking industry. 
The null hypothesis is Ho: {31ij = 0. It means that there is no increase in the degree 
of rivalry among the nationalized banks during the period in consideration. The alternative 
hypothesis is Hl: {31ii < 0 and {3lij > 0, for some of the i's and j's, and it means that 
competition has increased among some of the nationalized banks34• It must be stated that there 
exist other methodologies to test these hypotheses; for example, introducing a dummy variable 
in the specific~tion of the transition probabilities35 • 
The main advantage of using techniques based on the estimation of transition probabilities 
matrices is that it is possible to identify the source of rivalry;, thats is, from which rivals an 
specific bank is gaining or loosing customers. Therefore, one can identify areas (groups of 
firms) inside the nationalized sector of the banking industry where rivalry is increasing and areas 
where it is not increasing. 
34 I am not considering the other possibility: /3ii > 0 and {Jij < O, which 
means that a decrease in the degree of rivalry among nationalized banks has 
taken place. 
" In this case it is necessary to identify a pre-structural break and a 
post-structural break subperiod, then a transition probabilities matrix for 
the whole period must be estimated introducing a dummy variable to distinguish 
between the two subperiods. So, 
~ = 0 if t <= t*, (t* refers to the structural break point) 
~ = 1 otherwise 
The null hypothesis is true if /3rn < 0 and /32ij > O. 
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6.3 RIVALRY 
The same methodology used for 6.2 could be used to identify the characteristics of rivalry 
in a sector.of the private banks. For example, one could define a sector of the banking industry 
containing some of the largest private banks, e.g., Banco de San Jose, Banco del Comercio, 
Banco Banex, Banco Cooperati\ o, Ba co LLc , a 1 ...,0 '-' T, ~ o d --o :. er.to Agrico a 
Then, it is possible to use market share observations for these banks (market shares are redefined 
for the sector) for a period such as September 1984 to June 1990 (24 observations) to estimate 
the transition probabilities parameters36• , The choice of the private banks must take into 
consideration that the number of observations is very limited. 
This technique makes it possible to identify the areas in the sector where a very intense 
competition is taking place. Several hypotheses are possible. For example, one could 
hypothesize that there is no strong competition among the private banks in the sector. Thus, the 
diagonal elements of the Transition Probabilities Matrix should be very large, while the off-
diagonal elements should be very small (close to 0), at least for some banks. One could also 
hypothesize that the degree of rivalry among these large private banks is increasing over time, 
because it is becoming more difficult to increase market share through competition with the 
nationalized banks. Therefore, time-varying transition probabilities could be specified and a test 
similar to that mentioned in 6.2 could be applied. 
6.4 PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE BANKS 
The methodology in 6.2 and 6.3 could be used to study the characteristics of rivalry in 
a sector of the banking industry that contains the four nationalized banks and some private 
~ The definition of the period of analysis takes faces a trade off, it 
must not be so large that some large private banks can not be included, it 
must not be so short that the number of observations becomes very small. 
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banks. Again, it is important to be parsimonious with the number of banks included, because 
the number of observations available is very limited. For example, one could consider the four 
nationalized banks and the seven private banks mentioned in 6.3 as a sector of the industry, in 
order to estimate the transition probabilities matrix37• 
The methodology requires in this case to check which transition probabilities are 
significantly different from 0, allowing for the identification of the areas where a very intense 
competition is taking place. The main hypothesis is that the private banks are gaining market 
share at the cost of the nationalized ban.ks. This can be easily tested by checking the values of 
the transition probabilities. 
6.5 DETERMINANTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE 
It is possible to use the transition probabilities technique to test the kind of relationship 
. that exists between some exogenous variables and the evolution of the Costa Rican banking 
industry's structure. Once more, the constraints in the number of observations available demand 
moderation in the number of exogenous variables to be introduced in the estimation. 
A first variable to be considered is the fiscal deficit38• The hypothesis is that the size 
of the fiscal deficit affects the cost and availability of funds in the securities market (and in the 
funds market as a whole). Therefore, as a consequence of the asymmetric regulation applied 
with respect to banking inputs (deposits), where private banks do not have access to demand 
deposits, it is hypothesized that the market share of some private banks is negatively correlated 
37 This methodology could be .broadened to consider the whole banking 
industry in the following way: one could include the four nationalized banks, 
a few large private banks, and then pool the residual private banks into a 
single firm called others. Notice that this residual firm contains the entry 
effects, therefore, the interpretation of the corresponding transition 
probabilities must take into consideration the entry process. 
38 The fiscal deficit must be considered in real terms, or in reference 
to the size of the economy. 
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to the fiscal deficit, while the market share of the nationalized banks is positively correlated to 
the size of the fiscal deficit39• 
The hypothesis is that the fiscal deficit represents a heavier burden for the private banks 
(PB) than for the nationalized banks (NB)40• Hence, a reduction in the fiscal deficit would 
benefit more the former than the late . i ste , o; the f scai 1; icit, o 1e m y use the aver"be 
interest rate in the securities market. This would be a measure of the cost of funds in this 
market, but not necessarily of the availability of funds in the whole funds market. To test this 
hypothesis one must estimate the coefficients f30i; and f31u of the varying transition probabilities, 
then: 
(a) if i E NB, and j E PB, the null hypothesis is Ho: f3li; > 0, meaning that NB i 
increases market share at a cost to PB j's market share when the fiscal deficit increases. 
(b) if i E PB, and j E NB, the null hypothesis is Ho: {31i; < 0, meaning that PB i looses 
market share at the benefit to NB j's market share when the fiscal deficit increases. 
A second variable to be considered could be the expansion of the securities market, or 
the expansion of real M2, as a proxy for the degree of financial deepening41 • The hypothesis 
is that the market share of PB is positively correlated to the degree of financial deepening, while 
39 Notice that it could be possible to test this hypothesis by running a 
simple regression between the market share of each bank and the fiscal 
deficit. However, the result of this regression does not tell us the source 
of the change in the market share of the bank. 
~ In other words, a large fiscal deficit is a more serious disadvantage 
for PB than for NB because it increases the cost and crowds out the PB' s 
unique source of funds, while the NB also have access to the demand deposits 
(which may also be affected by the fiscal deficit depending on the elasticity 
of substitution). Notice that th is ef f ect happens in the input mar.ket, 
however, its consequences should be reflected in the output market. 
41 In fact these are proxies of the capacity of PB to circumvent the 
asymmetric regulation they are facing in the input market. Thus, they are 
associated with a process of regulatory avoidance. 
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the market share of NB is negatively correlated. The same kind of test could be applied to any 
other exogenous variable presumed to influence the evolution of the Costa Rican banking 
industry's structure. 
6.6 EXOGENOUS SHOCKS 
The estimation of a transition probabilities matrix for the banking industry may also take 
into account the existence of exogenous shocks caused by factors such as financial crises (i.e. 
1987-1988), changes in asymmetric regulation, and introduction of important innovations. The 
estimation methodology requires a consideration of varying transition probabilities, such a those 
in 6.5. But, instead of an exogenous variable, one must introduce a dummy-type variable in 
the specification of the transition probabilities42 • 
6. 7 FORECASTING 
Once the transition probabilities have been estimated, it is possible to forecast the 
evolution of the Costa Rican banking industry's structure. Moreover, concentration indices may 
be calculated and predicted. Two factors must be examined when forecasting the time path of 
the evolution of the industry's structure; first, the long-run equilibrium situation (the immovable 
point), which must be calculated; second, the speed at which the industry's structure moves 
towards the long-run equilibrium, which may be estimated. 
Two hypotheses are generated from this analysis. The first hypothesis states that the 
market share of the private banks will increase while the market share of the nationalized banks 
will decline in the long run. It is interesting to have an idea about the sizes that these sectors 
42 Following the time-series literature, the dummy variable could be 
specified in several forms to take into account the different kinds of shocks 
or interventions that may occur. For example, one could specify a step 
function for the shock, or a one shot or pulse shock; and their effects could 
vanish slowly or immediately. 
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will reach in the long run. The second hypothesis is more intricate, dealing with the speed at 
which the change of the industry's structure will occur in the future. Different factors are 
intervening in the determination of the speed. On the one hand, a learning by doing process in 
the private banks and an improvement in the regulatory avoidance process tend to increase the 
speed. On the other hand, the ieactiu. v J.c ti 1ar ze i 0ai1 sin : x nt y ? sand th~:r 7?10rf" 
aggressive behavior tend to reduce this speed. 
6.8 COMPETITION AMONG PUBLIC BANKS 
Concerning the behavior of the four nationalized banks, one may hypothesize that these 
banks were located in the same strategic position before the structural break. This assumes that 
the nationalized banks had accommodated to a comfortable position, where strategic innovation 
was scarce and where they were following the same conduct. With the emergence of the private 
banks, the government-owned banks were forced to react and to find new ways to compete 
strategically. Therefore, it is possible to hypothesize that, as a consequence of the nationalized 
banks' reaction, a dispersion in their strategic behavior has taken place. Thus, the nationalized 
banks can no longer be placed in the same cluster. 
Once the two periods for consideration have been chosen (e.g., from 1974 to 1980 and 
from 1984 to 1990); the following hypothesis can be tested by using clustering techniques: 
Ho: the four nationalized banks are in the same strategic cluster in the first period, but 
not in the second period. In the second period some banks have separated from the others, in 
the sense that they no longer can be clustered together43 • 
a A second way of testing the same hypothesis is to check whether the 
unidimensional measure of strategic distance between firms or groups (F /Fe) 
has increased between the two periods. 
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A variant of this hypothesis is that the nationalized banks reacted to the emergence of the 
private banks by changing their strategies (strategic position)44 • This hypothesis could be tested 
by applying the clustering technique to every nationalized bank for the two periods mentioned 
above. In other words, one must consider a bank in 1974-1980 and the same bank in 1984-1990 
as two different banks. The test requires to check whether they could be clustered or not. The 
null hypothesis Ho implies that a cluster is rejected. 
A clustering technique could also be used to test whether the nationalized banks and the 
private banks are located in different strategic positions. Thus, clustering analysis could be 
applied to the four nationalized banks and some private banks for which enough observations are 
available. The main hypothesis involves whether the banks are strategically homogeneous or 
not. This is: 
Ho: Banks are homogeneous. All banks in the same cluster. 
Hl: Banks are heterogeneous. Several clusters will be formed. 
A second hypothesis refers to whether the fast-growing private banks can be placed in 
the same cluster, implying that they are strategically closer, and the slow-growing private banks 
can be placed in a different cluster. This hypothesis attempts to test whether some private banks 
are growing more rapidly than others because they are located in a different strategic group or 
just because they are manipulating the strategic variables in a different way. 
~ It is important to clarify this concept of strategic clustering. To 
have two banks in the same strategic cluster does not mean that they are 
managing the strategic variables (i.e. financial ratios) in the same way, but 
that the relationship between the strategic variables and some performance 
variables is the same for both banks, and that in consequence if the two banks 
handl~ the strategic variables in the same way they will get the same results. 
If the two banks are in different clusters then even if they handle the 
strategic variables in the same way they will not get the same results. 
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Ho: Fast growing banks are homogeneous (all in same cluster). Slow growing banks are 
homogeneous (all in same cluster). Fast growing and slow growing banks are heterogeneous 
(not in same cluster). 
7. mE STATISTICAL INFO.t F.L r:·: J OURCES 
The techniques to test these hypotheses require the following data: 
First, data for earning assets and total assets can be used as proxies for the size of the 
banks, in order to calculate their market shares. This data come from the balance sheets of the 
banks, and the information is available quarterly for the period June, 1974 to June, 1990 through 
the Auditorfa General de Entidades Financieras, the entity in charge of overseeing the Costa 
Rican financial system. Thus, a total of 65 observations will be available for those banks that 
existed during the whole period; however, for the majority of private banks, which entered later, 
the number of observations is substantially lower. These constraints in the number of 
observations obviously limit the tests that can be undertaken. 
The use of a flow variable, such as the net change in the earning assets or total assets, 
to calculate the market share of the banks is a second option that must be explored. Obviously, 
a flow variable is more susceptible to recent changes in the industry than a stock variable45• 
The information about the regulatory environment is also managed by the Auditorfa, and 
it is easily available. 
The data about exogenous variables that may affect the evolution of the banking industry 
structure, such as the fiscal deficit, interest rates, and near moneis, corresponds to 
45 A stock variable shows the cumulative history of the banks 
performance, thus, it is less sensitive to recent changes. 
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macroeconomic variables that are available from the Central Bank of Costa Rica. Data about 
the securities market to be used as a proxy for regulatory avoidance of the demand deposits 
regulation can be obtained from the securities market itself (Balsa Nacional de Va/ores) and 
from the Central Bank. 
The clustering analysis requires to regress a dependent variable reflecting performance 
against a vector of independent variables indicating the conduct of the firms and other exogenous 
events. Real earning assets or their rates of growth can be used as proxies for the variable 
reflecting the performance of the banks46• The vector of independent variables will contain two 
or three managed financial ratios. They c~ be calculated from the income statements of the 
banks, which are available from the Auditorfa for every semester during the period June, 1974 
to June, 1990. The vector of independent variables would also contain one macroeconomic 
variable (GNP, GDP, M8) available from the Central Bank, and one structural variable such as 
the price of inputs (e.g., wages, and the interest rate paid by the government). 
46 If the relative size of the banks were calculated using a flow 
variable such as change in earning assets, then it would be reasonable to the 
rate of growth of this flow variable as a proxy for performance. The direct 
use of a variable measuring the size of the banks as a proxy for performance 
seems to fit better the purposes of the investigation than other variables 
commonly used as proxies of performance, such as profits. 
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